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EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF FIRM DYNAMICS
ABSTRACT
This paper considers two models for analyzing the dynamics of firm
behavior that allow for heterogeneity among firms, idiosyncratic (or firm-
specific) sources of uncertainty, and discrete outcomes (exit and/or entry).
Models with these characteristics are needed for the structural econometric
analysis of several economic phenomena, including the behavior of capital
markets when there are significant failure probabilities, and the analysis of
productivity movements in industries with large amounts of entry and exit.
In addition, these models provide a means of correcting for the self-section
induced by liquidation decisions in empirical studies of firms responses to
alternative policy and environmental changes. It is shown that the two
models have different nonparametric implications -implicationsthat depend
only on baaic behavioral assumptions and mild regularity conditions on the
functional forms of interest (one distinction between them corresponds to the
distinction between heterogeneity and an ergodic form of state-dependence; a
form in which the effect of being in a state in a particular period erodes
away as time from that period lapses). The nonparametric implications enable
the construction of testing and selection correction procedures that are easy
to implement (they do not require the computstionslly difficult, and
functional-form specific, estimation algorithms that have been used to
empirically analyze stochastic control models with discrete outcomes in the
past). The paper concludes by checking for the implications of the two
models on an eight-year panel of Wisconsin firms. We find one model to be
consistent with the data for retail trade.
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1. Introduction
This paper considers the empirical implications of two models of the
dynamics of firm behavior that allow for heterogeneity among firms,
idiosyncratic (or firm—specific) sources of uncertainty, and discrete
events (exit and/or entry). Our reason for providing an empirical
framework with these features are twofold. First, the nature of
uncertainty, and its relationship to exit and/or entry, is atthe heart of
several issues we, as economists, try to analyze. Examples includethe
analysis of capital markets when there are diverse possible outcome paths
and significant failure probabilities; the evolution of the size
distribution of the firms in an industry; and the analysis of industry
supply (or productivity) changes when more efficient firmsthrive and grow,
and less efficient contract and, in the extreme case, exit. The second
reason for studying models that allow for uncertainty andexit is that some
allowance has to be made for these phenomena before we can get an accurate
empirical picture of firms' responses to any policy orenviornmental
change. Table 1 illustrates why this is so.
The table provides information on the fraction of firms operating in
'wisconsin in 1978 that were liquidated by 1986 (more details on thedata
will be given in Section 5). Firms are classified as liquidated onlyif
they physically closed down (changes of ownership aretreated separately).
If we were to use these data to build a panel of firms to follow the impact
of some (say) policy change, we would, at least traditionally, startfrom
the 1978 cross—section and then construct the panel by eliminating those
firms not in operation over the entire eight—year period. Column 5 shows
that this procedure would lose a third of the firms due to liquidations,
and column 6 shows that this third would account for about a fifthof the3
jobs in 1978. If we decided to consider only the larger of the 1978 firms,
say those with more than 50 employees (and as column 7 shows, this is a
selection which, by itself, omits over a third of the 1978 jobs),
liquidation would be somewhat less prevalent, but would still cause an
attrition rate of about 15 percent. The last two rows of the table give an
indication of the extent of changes in ownership in this data (this
includes mergers and acquisitions). To the extent that the pre and post
change firms cannot be spliced together, changes in ownership also generate
attrition. It is a relatively more important source of attrition among
larger firms, but even if we confine ourselves to firms with over 50
employees, and assume that all the changes in ownership result in
attrition, changes of ownership would still only account for 40 percent of
total attrition (liquidation accounts for the rest). Note that, when taken
together, liquidations and changes of ownership would cause the attrition
of almost half the firms in the 1978 sample, and of about a quarter of
those with more than 50 employees.
If liquidation decisions were independent of the economic phenomena
typically being investigated, then the omission of the liquidated firms
from the sample might lead to an imprecise, but would not lead to an
inconsistent, description of the phenomena of interest. This is, however,
hardly likely. Firms terminate their activities when they perceive adverse
changes in the distribution of their future profit streams. The phenomena
we typically want to investigate involve the actual profitability (and
productivity) changes resulting from alternative policy and environmental
changes. If there is any relationship at all between perceptions and
realizationswe will, by eliminating those firms which liquidate, omit
precisely those firms for whom the events in question are likely to have4
had a particularly negative impact. That is, we will tend to omit one tail
of the distribution of responses we set out to study.1
To control for the selection induced by the liquidation process we
need a model that explains why firms operating in similar environments
develop differently —amodel with idiosyncratic outcomes that allows for
exit. At least two such models are currently available, andeachwill, no
doubt, prove more useful in approximating the characteristics of different
industries in different time periods. This paper provides a simple set of
procedures which enable the researcher to determine whether either of them
might be relevant for the problem at hand.
The first model considered here is a model with passive Bayesian
learning. Firms are endowed at-birth with an unknown value of a
time—invariant profitability parameter which determines the distribution of
its profits thereafter. Past profit realizations contain information on
the value of the parameter which determines the distribution of possible
future profit streams, and this fact is used by management to form a
probability distribution over future net cash flows (see Jovanovic, 1982).
The second model is a model of active exploration. It assumes that the
firm knows the current value of the parameter that determines the
distribution of its profits, but that the value of that profitability
parameter changes over time in response to the stochastic outco.es of the
firm's own investments, and those of other actors in the same market (see
Ericson and Pakes, 1989). In both models firms act so as to maximize the
expected discounted value of future net cash flow, and in both cases
optimal behavior generates a set of stopping states; i.e. outcomes which,
ifrealized,would induce the firm to exit. loreover, both models are
'corplete' in the sense that if we were willing to append a set of precise5
functional form assumptions to them, they would produce frameworks rich
enough to take directly to data.
The strategy of appending precise functional form assumptions and then
using their implications to structure the data, is the strategy taken in
all of the recent econometric literature on analyzing stochastic control
models involving discrete outcomes (see liller, 1984; Volpin, 1984; Pikes,
1986; and lust, 1987). Its success depends upon, among other diverse
factors, the extent of prior information on the relevance of alternative
nssunptions. We eschew it here because there is not a great deal of a
information on either which of the models (if any) is appropriate
for different data sets or on the relevance of alternative functional form
assumptions. loreover, just as in all the previous literature on discrete
choiceoptimalstochastic control models, were we to estimate fully
parametric versions of these models we would have to build a different
—ion algorithm for each form estimated. This makes it difficult, if
npossible, to examine the robustness of the major empirical results to
ciLanges in the specification of the model.
The alternative strategy we choose is to look for empirical
implications of the different models that depend only on the models' basic
behavioral assumptions, and some mild regularity conditions on the relevant
functional forms. Precisely because these 'nonparametric' implications
have to be valid for a variety of functional forms, they cannot require
onal form specific estimation and testing algorithms. Consequently,
there are computationally simple ways of checking whether they are
consistent with the data. Therefore, in addition to not being dependent on
particular functional form assumptions, our strategy is easy to implement.
Ontheother hand, the nonparametric procedures provided here do not6
produce precise values for alternative response parameters. Their goals
are only to provide a low cost, easily interpretable, characterization of
the data which suffices to: 1) distinguish which, if either, of the
alternative models seems relevant for the problem at hand, and 2) act as a
basis for building a procedure for correcting for the selection problem
induced by the liquidation process when one of the models seems
appropriate.
One of the nonparametric differences between the two models
corresponds to the distinction between heterogeneity and state dependence
that has played so large a role in labor econometrics (see leckian, 1981;
Chamberlain, 1984; and Recknan and Singer; 1984). In particular the
passive learning model implies that the stochastic process generating the
size of a firm is characterized by a generalized form of heterogeneity,
while the model with active exploration implies that this stochastic
process is generated by a quite general form of state dependence. Theory
restricts the state dependence in the active learning model to have ergodic
characteristics; i.e. the effect of being in a state in a particular period
erodes away as time from that period lapses. So we develop a test for the
distinction between heterogeneity and ergodic forms of state dependence
based on —niixing conditions. The test is simple, intuitive, and seems to
be able to distinguish between the two models on panel data sets the size
of the ones used here (these follow about 400 observations over eight
years).
In particular, we find both the —mixing test, and an analysis of the
evolution of the size distribution of firms in a cohort, suggest that one
model is consistent with the data for manufacturing, while the other seems
consistent with the data for retail trade. The importance of this result7
is twofold. First the different models have distinctly different
implications for the manner and the extent to which fin—specific
uncertainties get resolved over time, and hence for the way in which issues
related to these uncertainties ought to be analyzed. Second, the two
models imply different determinants for the probability of liquidation, and
hence different procedures for correcting for liquidation induced attrition
in the analysis of firm's responses to alternative policy and enviromiental
changes.
Section 2 of the paper outlines the passive learning model and then
derives its nonparametric implications. Section 3 does the same for the
model with active exploration. In Section 4 we develop appropriate
estimation and testing procedures. Section 5 begins with a description of
the Visconsin panel, and then examines various subsets of it for the
implications of the two models. Section 6 considers further implications
of the empirical results.
Notation
The distribution of any random variable, say x, conditional on any
event, say z, is denoted Px(.lz), and its density (with respect to the
implied dominating measure) by px(•Iz)• Superscripts denote the vector of
all prior realizations of a process, and subscripts denote a particular
value, so x =(x1,...,xt).
Veak vector inequalities are interpreted
element by element, but a strong vector inequality means only that at least
one of the element by element inequalities is strong. Z will be used for
the generic set, and z for a member of that set. Lemmas, theorems,
examples etc. will be numbered in one consecutive ordering within each
section. They are referred to in the following sections with a section8
prescript.
Section 2. Passive Learnin&.
This section considers models in which each firm is endowed with a
time—invariant characteristic which determines the distribution of its
prof its, but whose value is not known to management at the timethefirm
begins operation. lodels of industries composed of f iris which learn about
an unknown profitability paraneter have been provided by Jovanovic (1982)
and Lippman and Rumelt (1982). Following Jovanovic (1982), we consider a
Bayesian learning process. At entry the firm believes the value of its
characteristic, say 9, is a random draw fro. some known distribution. Each
period the firm is in operation it obtains a realization from the
distribution of profits conditional on the true value of its 9. These
realizations are used to compute a sequence of posterior distributions.
The posterior available in each period is used as a basis for
decision—making in that period. The decisions of interest are whether to
produce at all and, if so, at what scale. If the firm does decide not to
produce it sells off its assets and exits, never to reappear again. Note
that in this model learning is passive in the sense that information is
obtained as a costless byproduct of operating. One possible analogy is to
the operation of a retail outlet. The outlet learns whether its
neighborhood will support its product, and, if so, at which scale of
operation.
Jovanovic (1982) focuses on establishing the existence of a perfect
foresight equilibrium for a homogeneous product industry composed of firms
which operate in this manner. Ve focus on the implications of the learning
process on the evolution of cohorts of firms, where cohorts aredefined by9
entry dates. In particular we shall look for empirical implications that
rely on the nature of the learning process, and only some mild regularity
conditions on the form of the profit function and the underlying
distributions of interest. Later we compare these implications to data in
an attempt to identify those sectors in which this for. of learning process
seems relevant.
2.1 The lodel
It will be assumed that each entrant is endowed with a value of 0
which,in turn, determines the distribution of a payoff relevant random
variable 17,say
P,7(.I0).
Tomotivate our assumptions, consider the example
of a homogeneous product industry of price—takers whose production
efficiencies are subject to random perturbations so that profits in period
tare = F(t)
— where; is a vector of input quantities,
providestheir prices, F(.) is a concave production function, {,} is a
sequence of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random





and7(17; p) is an increasing function of ,.Ina perfect foresight
equilibrium future prices will be known, so that if 9 were also known the
distribution of future profits could be calculated directly from
Since management does not know 0 it is assumed to summarize its beliefs
about that parameter in terms of a probability distribution over the10
possible values of 0. At entry, ianage.ent only knows that 9 is a random
draw from G0(0). The first period produces an which .anagenent uses,
together with Bayes law, to update its prior [G0(9)] and for. a posterior
which is then used to .ake second period decisions. If the fir. stays in
operation, this updating process continues and decisions are .ade on the
basis of the sequence of updated posteriors.
As the exaaple illustrates, the .odel viii require at least four
primitives; a sequence of random variables, a class of distributions for
those random variables indexed by 0, a prior distribution for 9, and a
payoff function. Before introducing these pri.itives we need a way of
comparing distribution functions; i.e. we need an interpretation for the
statement that one value of 0 is 'better than' another. Ve shall assume
that the family of distributions foraed froa different values of 9 can be
ordered in the likelihood ratio sense defined below. This ensures that
higher realizations of the payoff relevant 77leadto Bayesian posteriorS
for 6 that assign larger probability to higher values of 9 (see below, and
ilgroin, 1981).
1.Definition(likelihood ratio ordering, or
Let P1(.) and P2(.) be two distributions possessing densities
and p2(.) (with respect to some douiinating .easure), and with support,
a compact subset of &,k—dimensionalEuclidean space. Ye will say that P1






and p1(z1) or p2(z2) >0,z1,z2 Ezk.If weak
inequalities replace the strong inequalities in this definition, we will
say that F1 likelihood ratio dominates P2 in the weak sense, and write
Fl P2.
[]
IfP1 >tr 2 then, for any two possible values of z,the ratio of the
probabilities of a larger to the smaller z value is always higher for F1;
i.e., P1 is more likely to have generated the higher z value.2 The
following lenuna points out that >Lr is a stronger criteria for ordering
distribution functions than the more familiar first order stochastic
-:ecriteria.
2. (likelihoodratios and stochastic dominance).
Say P1 stochastically dominates P2, and write P1 >F2,
if and only if





l >tr implies, P1 >P2.
If weak inequalities replace the strong inequalities in this definition we
say that P1 stochastically dominates P2 in the weak sense, andwrite
l>sw2 p1 >lrw P2 implies P112
EtQQI See koss(1983),Appendix 1, 3.1, and 4.1. [
Assumption3 provides the primitives of the passive learning •odel and
endows then with some regularity conditions. It generalizes the
assumptions used in our example. In particular the exasple assned that
conditional on a 6E8, the sequence of payoff relevant random variables,
are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time.
Then the joint distribution of the sequence {,j}conditionalon a DEB is
entirely described by the single distribution, P,7(I). Though the i.i.d.
case is easy to deal with, it produces a host of very strong empirical
implications which are a result of the i.i.d. assumption and not of the
logic of the passive learning model per se. Ve, therefore, allow for
dependence in the stochastic process generating conditionalon 9. In
(3.i) we assume only that the marginal distribution of conditional on 0
is stationary (does not depend on time), and that the conditional
distribution of (conditional on past 17—realizations) satisfies the
condition that higher past values of ,areat least as likely to lead to
higher future values of ,.(3.ii)insures that higher values of 0 are
better in the £r—sense; i.e. it insures that for any t, higher values of
the vector =(ia, ..., ,) aremore likely to be generated by larger U
values. (3.iv)providesthe profit and size functions. It is important
that both be increasing in 17.3
3.Assumption (primitives of the model)
(1) {}isa sequenceof payoff relevant random variables (a
stochastic process) whose joint distribution, say (0), is indexed by a
98, where 8 is a compact subset of .Themarginal distribution of tis13
stationary and is denoted by while its conditional distribution
satisfies a weak tr—ordering in realizations of saynt_i: i.e.
P(.In1, >irw P,7(.14', 0)
whenever >n4.
(ii) The family of distributions
F ={(O):ho),
have marginal distributions with support N (a compact subset of and
densities with respect to some dominating measure. Further, these





(iii) G0(.) is a prior probability distribution with density g0(•) on
0.
(iv) i-(.)andS(.) are continuous increasing functions from N into P.
(.)providesthe payoff to, and S(.) the size of, the firm. [J
Ourbehavioral assumption is that management acts so as to maximize
the expected discounted value of future net cash flow conditional on
current information, where the conditional distribution of future net cash14
flows are formed, in a Bayesian fashion, from; the faaily of processes
(G), the prior for 0[G0(.)],
and past realizations of ',say
=(iii, ' 'Y Thenext assumption provides these conditional
distributions.
4. Assumption [posterior distributions]
Let contain all information available in period t. Then
Pr{6 ￿ zIJ} =
P'7t(nItIO
￿ z)Go(z)//Pt(ntIC)Go(dC) P0(zlnt),
for z8. loreover P0(.Jnt) has a density, p#(.Int), with respect to the G0
measure (for N, and all t).
Lemma 5 states that, under the £r—ordering assumptions, higher past i
realizationslead to more favorable posteriors for 0.Itfollows directly
from Bayes law and assumption (3.ii).4
5. Lemma(monotonicityof posteriors)
For any t, let4 with 4 >4
,then
P0(.14) >lr 0(I4 [ ]
Nowconsider the decision problem facing the owners of a firmwhich
has been in existence t periods and has had rrealizationsof The
owners must choose whether to continue in operation over the coming period,
orclose down and sell the firm atthe value, I. If the owners decide to15
operate the firm they will obtain the profits over the coming period, plus
the option of keeping the firm in operation over subsequent periods should
they desire to do
Assume,temporarily, the existence of a bounded function, say
Vt+i(nt), from Nt41 into I, which provides the value of continuing in
operation from period t+1 given a realization of ij equal to Then,
letting flE(O,1) be the discount factor, we have
(6) t(nt) =E[I-(Vt+j)Int]
+
wherefor any h(.), the expectation E[h(,?t)Int3 =fh(c,nt)p(dclnt).
Vt
Given (6) the optimal strategy of the owner is straightforward. Operate
the firm if and only if Vt(nt) ￿ I. Theorem 7 insures that the value
function in (6) exists and then provides some of its properties.
7.Theorem(existence and montonicity of the value function)
At each tthereexists a unique Vt(Nt which provides the value
of continuing in operation assuming optimal behavior in each future period.
is bounded, satisfies (6), and is nondecreasing in flt; i.e., if 4￿
4,thenV(4)￿V(4) [for ntcNt, and all t]
F.ip.i See Appendix I. [
Notethat Theorem 7 depends only on Assumption 3. It does not depend
on: the precise functional form (or even the curvature) of the profit16
junction (so the production function could display regions of increasing
returns); on the form of G0(.); or on the family I' provided that it satisfy
the monotone likelihood ratio properties in (3) (in particular the
posteriors for 9 need not possess simple sufficient statistics, nor need
they be weakly continuous in their arguments). We now move on to consider
the empirical implications of the passive learning model and we shall focus
on implications which require only the assumptions reviewed above
2.2 Empirical Implications of Passive Learning.
Throughout we shall focus on the empirical i.plications of the passive
learning model that are true at each age (that model also has limit
properties as age grows large, but it is hard to use these as a basis for
empirical analysis without further, a priori, information). We begin by
deriving the implications of the passive learning model on the evolution of
thesize distribution of firms.
Thetheorem that underlies our results on the evolution of the size
distributionis theeconomist's (far more palatable) version of the
Darwiniandictum of"survival of the fittest." Itstates that as age
increases the 0—distribution of the surviving firms improves (in the
stochasticdominance sense).This is a result of self—selection. As time
passes firms with lower 9's are more likely to draw lower 's and
self—liquidate.
8. Theorem (the evolution of the 0—distribution)17
Let At ={t=(n1,•••' V1(n)> ,•• '(')> I}, and
+11ft6jt
Xt(n)=1 t LO ifn $L
Then a firm is still operating in period t if and only if =1.Parther,





£° Take an arbitrary (z, t). Then, by Bayes law,






,e must show thatP0(zlt—1) > P9(zlt).













Pr{xt_i=lj O}C0(dO)/9< 2JPr{xt_i=1I S}G0(dS), otherwise
(8.1) can be rewritten as
(8.3) eJPr{xt=iIxt_irl,O}Qi(dO) ￿ eJPr{xt=lIxt..1=1,O}Q2(dO).
Since (8.2) implies Q1(.) Q2(.), (8.3)will be true provided
Pr{x=1!xt_i=i,O} is nondecreasing in 0. To see that this is indeedthe
case write
=JPr{xt=iInt,O}Fti{dntIntEAti,6}.







where the first inequality follows from the monotonicity of V(.) andthe
fact that Pnt,0)isstochastically increasing in 0,andthe second19
iron (3.1) and the fact that if F >tr(•19'then,for any ANt,
p 9) >tr Pt(.kteA,0) (see loss, 1982, appendix I).
Our first empirical implication of the passive learning model is a
direct corollary of theorem 8. Since size is an increasing function of 17,
andis stochastically increasing in 9, the fact that the 9 distribution
of the surviving firms is stochastically increasing over time implies that
the size distribution of surviving firms ought to be stochastically
increasing in time.
9. Corollary (The evolution of the size distribution.)






Thereare many ways of employing Corollary 9 to identify industries
that might abide by the passive learning .odel. The simplest is to plot
the size distribution for different ages and compare then; the proportion
of the sample greater than any given size should increase in age. lore20
generally the corollary implies that if h(.) is anyincreasingfunction,
then whenever t￿t'
E(t)=Jh(C)P5(dClt)Jh(C)P8(dIt') =
Sowe could take the sample analogue of E(t)[the samplemean ofh(s)),and
investigatewhetherit increases in age. We come back to these points
below. Note also that Theorem (8) andCorollary(9)implythat each
sequence of distribution functions, {P9(•lt)}, and{P5(.It)},converges
(pointwise),to a well—defined limiting distribution, say P8(•Im)and
1=).
Implications of the passive learning model that specify a sonotonic
relationship between two or more observables are particularly useful since
they can be checked against data without imposing undue functional form
restrictions. Though the literature on the passive learning model seems to
have missed Corollary 9, it has associated at least three other monotonic
relationships with passive learning. These are that:
i) the hazard rate is nonincreasing in current size; i.e., that
Pr{Xt=OIyt_il, S_1=si} is nonincreasing in
ii) the hazard rate is nondecreasing in age (usually, but not always,
conditional on size);
iii) and that the variance in growth rates (again usually conditional
on size) is nonincreasing in age
(these implications are discussed in Jovanovic, 1982; Evans, 1987a and
1987b; and Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1987).
The next example shows that of these three only the first survives our
search for nonparametric implications of the passive learning model (the21
example assumes, as did Jovanovic, 1982, that the distribution of {v)
conditionalon 0 is i.i.d.). It is true, however, that the first
implication, that is that hazard rates are nonincreasing in size at a given
age, both persists and is consistent with the datafrom every empirical
study we are aware of [Churchill, 1955; Vedervang, 1965; Evans 1987s and
1987b; Dunne, koberts, and Sanuelson, 1987]. lowever, most other models
that allow for mortality, including Ericson and Pales's (1989) model of
active exploration, also imply mortality rates that decrease in size for a
given age. Therefore, this property fails to distinguish amongthe
alternative models, and we do not pay further attention to it in this
paper.
As to the other implications, the fact that the passive learning model
does not imply that either hazard rates, or the variance in growth rates,
decline in age (at least not without further ad hoc assumptions) is
somewhat disconcerting. Decreasing hazards and decreasing variances in
growth rates have both been associated with the passive learningmodel in
the past, and, in addition, have been shown to be fairly robust featuresof
the data. On the other hand, the intuition underlying our counterexample
is clear enough. For many functional forms it will tale time to accumulate
the information necessary to ensure that exit is optimal, and this fact
generates an initial increasing portion to the hazard function (actually
the example generalizes this intuition and generates a hazard function
which oscillates over age). As to differences in the variance in growth
rates over age, these will depend upon, among other factors, the relative
variances of ,conditionalon 0 for different values of 0. If 6—values
which are more likely to induce exit are associated with low variances, the22
observed variance in growth rates may well increase over age.
10. Exaile
Let = with{,}i.i.d.conditional on 9,
1 with probability 0 6 with probability £
'7= ;andO=
0 otherwise 0 otherwise
The posterior for 9 in this problem depends only on the couple (xt,t),
where x =max[n1,...,ni].




x is either 0 or 1. If managementknows that 0=5 and a direct
calculation shows
V(i,t) =
wherethe inequality is by assumption. This inequality ensures that if
x=l management will never drop out. If x=O the firm continues in
operation if and only if V(0,t) ￿ I. It is easy to show that
Pr{xti=1Ixt=0,t} =Pr{'7t+i=1xt=O,t}
decreases in t, and converges to
zero. This ensures that V(0,t) decreases in t and converges to zero.
Clearly then, there exists a unique tsuch that V(0,t) ￿ $ if andonlyif
t￿tLetS('7t=l)S, S(i=0) =0,ft(t,St) bethe hazard rate for the
firmsof size St in period t,andE(t) be theunconditional hazard.23
Straightforward calculations show that for
li(t,St=O) I(t,St=S) 1(t)




So neither the conditional, nor the unconditional, hazard declines in age.
T. imply reflects the fact that for manypossibleassumptions on the
relevant functional forms it will take tue to gather the information
required to decide whether exit is optimal.
*
liextwe consider the variance in growth rates. Provided t > t ,any
firm that is active has B =5,and V(St+i_StIS)=V(St+iIO4) =525(1_a),
ofSt. If t <tand St =5,then B still is 5 with probability
and V(S÷t—StISt) is still given by the above formulae. So the
,c.:iance in growth rates conditioned on St =Sis constant over age.
However, if t <t,andSt =0,then 0 can equal either 5 or 0 with
positive probability, and the variance in the growth rate is
[5S2(i_1)(1_5)t]/[(1t) +(15)1]2.Thus
V(St+i—StlSt =0,t> t*)/V(St+l_StISt=0, t<tt) =1(i+;5fl2,
which cLE be made as large as we like by choosing 5 or £ small enough. The
variance in growth rates need not decline in age. Vhether or not they do
Will depend upon whether growth rates associated with high 0's are more24
variant than growth rates associated with low l's, an issue which the basic
passive learning model is silent on.
To see how this example generalizes, consider the case where 9 has a
beta prior distribution with parameters (r,s), i.e., G0(.) =B(r,s),so
that 9 can take any value between zero and one. The posterior in this case
t
is another beta with parameters r + anda+t— sothat the sum,
t
x = andt, can be used as sufficient statistics. (Note that x is a
nonnegative integer.) Using an argument analogous to that given above we
find that for any fixed x, V(x,t) declines to zero with t. Thus for each x
there exists a t(x) such that V(x,t) I according as ttt(x) [see
Figure 1] .Boththe mortality, and the hazard rate will be zero for a
* *
valueof t such that t (x) < t < t (x+l) (for x =1,2, ...).loreoverit
* *
canbe shown that t (x-*l) cannot equal t (x)+1 for consecutive values of x.
That is, the hazard function will usually have a zero between any two
*
positiveportions, making it oscillate over age. For t =t(x) the hazard
and mortality rates will be determined by the precise form of the prior.
One such sequence of hazard rates is given in the bottom part of Figure 1.
Similar pictures could be drawn for the variance in growth rates. [
Thisexample illustrates that if we are interested in other
nonparametric implications of the passive learning model we should look
beyond the implications of passive learning on the pattern of either the
hazard or the variance in growth rates. It is, therefore, fortunate that
the passive learning model has some very distinctive implications on the
underlying structure of the conditional probabilities generating growth and
mortality.25
These implications stem primarily from the fact that 0 is
time—invariant. As a result, early realizations of contain information
about the parameter that determines the distribution of its future values;
and this will be true no matter the time that elapses in the interim. Put
differently, the dependence in the joint distribution of and does not
erode away as t grows large. This is seen most clearly in the special case
where, conditional on 0, the {,j}arean i.i.d. process. In this case, for






which is independent of t and k. This strong invariance property is
destroyed when we allow 0 to index the more general family of stochastic
processes permitted in (3). In the general case we have, for any zfN,
P7(zlVk =n')= (zkk
=n',O)Po(dOIVkn'),
and since P (zIVk =n',O)can depend upon t and k, so can P (zI7 =n').
Vt
fiowever, the passive learning model does imply that the dependence in this
latter distribution has two sources, one of which will erode away as t
grows large. That is, though the dependence in the process generating
conditional on 0 (in the integrand) may erode away with t (it will if the
process generating is ergodic), the dependence that results from the
effect of the realization of on the posterior for 0 will not.
This argument can be formalized and then used to produce a test for26
the passive learning model based on differences between the marginal
distribution of St =S(t),
and the distribution of S conditional on S1.
Actually we can do better than this and produce tests based on a comparison
of the distribution of S conditional on to the distribution
of S conditional on S_1,... and Si, for any k￿O. With a positive k
this test is likely to be more powerful against alternatives in which the
value of the paraLeter determining the firm's distribution of profits
evolves in a larkovian fashion over tile (and one such alternative is the
model of active exploration considered in the next section).
Our test is a direct implication of the following theorem. The
theorem states that if we choose group of years for which there is
information on past realizations of ,andderive the family of posterior
distributions for 0 conditional on possible ,—realizations in those years,
then members of the family with higher past n—realizations will
stochastically dominate those with lower n—realizations.
11. Theorem (conditional distributions for
Let t and k be positive integers with t￿k, and (i1,.. ,i) be any
selection of k distinct elements from {l,.. .,t—1}.Then if n =
(n,...,n )andn =(n2,...,n2 )arearbitrary (1'k histories of
1 k '1




The empirical implication of theorem (11) that we will be using is
that it implies that for any k ￿ 0, and any •••
(12) P,7Hnt_l,.,mt_fj!Xt=l))
whenever n1 n. Corollary (13) is an immediate i.plication of (12).
13. Corollary
Let t and k be nonnegative integers with t>k, and let Xt be defined as





is strictly increasing in s for almost every [1
That is, expected future size conditional on I past sizes and survival
will be strictly increasing in the initial size. This is because the
parameter which determines the conditional distributionof the payoff
relevant r is time—invariant. In models in which these conditional
distributions depend on a paraieter which evolves over time in response to,
say, the outcomes of a firm's exploratory investment,corollary (13) will
not necessarily be true. Ve turn to these types of models now.
Section 3. Active Exploration
This section considers the empirical implications of a model
(originally developed by Ericson and Pakes, 1989), in whichfirms can28
invest to improve the value of a parameter, say w, which deter.ines the
distribution of its profits. In the model with active exploration (in
contrast to in the passive learning •odel) management is assumed to know
its current value of ,(andhence the actual profit distribution it faces),
and makes current production decision based on it. On the other hind a,
itself evolves over time in response to the outcomes of the firm's own
investment process, and the investments of other firms operating in related
markets. These outcomes are stochastic; in the active exploration model
the firm invests to explore and develop alternative market niches which
may, or may not, prove profitable.
In this model the distribution of futures states is determined
entirely by the current state and the optimal investment policy. It is,
therefore, independent of the age of the firm per se. Startup is treated
as the appearance of an idea which, given current market conditions,
--°arsworth exploring. Formally it is an initial location on the &—axis.
idea requires substantial successful development before it can
noticeable profits, the initial & is associated with a
distribution of profits which is degenerate (or nearly so) at zero.
Successful investment will enable the idea to be embodied in a more
profitable marketable good or service. 3nsuccessful exploration may well
convince the entrepeneur that the whole idea is not worth pursuing and lead
to liquidation.
Ericson and Pakes begin with a simple model in which the distribution
of the firm's profits depends only on the difference between the firm's own
level of development and an exogenous aggregate index of the state of the
industry. They then generalize to cases in which the firm's profit
distribution also depends explicitly on the levels of developueTit of all29
the encumbents in, and the potential entrants to, the industry. Here we
suffice with a brief description of the simpler model, as this special case
of the more general framework is sufficient to contrast its empirical
implications to those of the passive learning model just described. Again
we consider only those empirical implications that are nonparaaetric in the
sense that they require only mild regularity conditions on the relevant
functional forms.
The Active Exploration Nodel
Ve will assume that the state space is countable and index it by the
integers so that n1l. Each firm operating in period t is endowed with an
Higher values of iarebetter in the sense that the distribution of
the payoff relevant iisstochastically increasing in .lanagementhas
three choices to make in each period, and they are made to maximize the
expected discounted value of future net cash flows. First the firm must
decide whether to operate at all. If it decides against it receives a
liquidation value of I and exits never to reappear again. If the firm does
operate management must decide on both a level of current input demand, and
an amount of exploratory investment, say x. Given a realization of ,
currentinput choices will determine current operating profits, say r(7).
Current cash flows are
=
wherec(.)>O, and can be decreasing in &toreflect the possibility that
moreprofitablefirmsmayfind it easier to raise finance capital.
Increasesincurrent investment decrease current cash flow but makehigher30
values of andhence higher future profits, more likely. In
particular, let Tt+l=Yt+1—ft, and be the information available to
management at t. Then we assume that for zd,
P(r+i￿zIJt) =Pr(ZtIXt)
where P(.Ixt) is stochastically increasing in x.lence, to formalize the
firm's decision problem we will require the following primitives.t
1. Assumotion (primitives of the active exploration model)
i)iP ={P(.I):41(},is a family of distribution functions indexed
by .Thefamily has support, ti, a compact subset of D containing zero,
and exhibits a weak first order stochastic dominance ordering in w, i.e.
P(.Iu) >sw P(.i')
whenever &> ui'.Itis assumed that Liz P(Ol&)=1. (This, together with
the assumption that 7(0) =0,insures that for small enough w payoffs are
zero with probability arbitrarily close to one.)
ii) r ={P(.Ix):x+}
is a family of distributions with support T,
a compact subset of ,exhibitinga weak first order stochastic dominance
ordering in x, i.e.31
P(.Ix) P(.Ix')
whenever x >x',and satisfying the condition that
P(OIO) =1,
so that the firm's product cannot be isproved without some investment. The
family of densities {p7(.jx):xdR}, is (pointwise) differentiable in x with
derivatives which are decreasing in x for r >0,and increasing in x for r
c 0 (this insures that the investment problem is concave and therefore has
a unique solution), and both p(OIx) and p(_1Ix) are strictly positive for
all x less than any finite upper bound (these are technical conditions
whose roles are explained in more detail below).
iii) r(.) and S(.) are increasing functions of ,,andc(.) is
non—increasing function of w, into Dc. r(.) provides the profits, and S(.)
provides the size, of the firn; while c(.) provides the cost of a unit of
x. z(0) =0,and c() is bounded away from zero. []
lenow consider management's choice of policies. Letting w0 be the
initial state and x,. be the indicator function which takes the value one if
the firm is active in period r and zero elsewhere, a policy, say d, is a
sequence of functions mapping available information into operating and
investment decisions, that is32
d ={0(J0),x0(30), x1(J1) x1(J1),...},
with x. = andx. =0implying =0for x,. = and
{wr,Xr_i,xr_i,r_i,.,wO}. kecall that =
ifx=l and zero otherwise, so the expected discounted value of net cash
flows given the policy d is
Ed {EfiTR(r&rxrXr) +'(Xr_iXr)JI"}
where fi(O,l) is a discount factor, and the expectation is taken assumin




for each .Apolicy d will be optimal if vd.(w) =V(a)for all w. If
optimal policy exists management chooses it, in which case the expected
discounted value of future net cash flow is V(i). lanagement will opera
the firm if and only if V(&) > I, the liquidation value. The following
theorem combines the results from Ericson and Pales (1989) that are used
our derivation of the empirical implications of their model. The theore
is followed by diagrammatic and verbal expositions of its contents.
2. Theorem (properties of the active exploration model).
A unique optimal policy and associated value function exist and the
have the following characteristics:33
i)V() is bounded and nondecreasing in a.
ii) The optimal policy, x(J) is bounded, depends only on current i, and




iii)There exists a couple, (,) with,—< < m, suchthat
x*(i) =0if 0 {,':￿ o' ￿
iv) There exists a second couple (,), with— £ ￿ .￿'￿< ,
suchthat
V() > I if and only if & > £,
and
mimi Pr{1t￿ =1.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Parts (i) and (ii) of this theorei ensure that both the value function
and investment policy are stationary functions of w, the value function
being increasing in 4/. Figure 2 illustrates this with one special case.
In the figure A(4/) =
/T(i)P,7(d17I4/),
provides expected profits conditional
on .Thevalue of 4/ below which a firm exits, i.e. the £ in (2.iv), is34
determined by the point at which V(i) equals I. In this example =v,
that value of & below which a firm stops investment. So positive
investment occurs at#1,even though profits at that point are zero vi
probability one. The incentive for the investment is that it sakes highe
values of and hence higher future profits, sore likely. The moneta
value of an increase in w is V(w.1) —Y(u).Since V(w) is bounded, aft
some point increases in icannotbring with it such of a change in V(.).
It follows that, after some w, it will not be in the firs's interest to
invest at all. The &atwhich this occurs is theof (2.iii). If w >
"o investment takes place and this insures (see 1.ii) that the firs's w
notincrease(in fact it will stochastically deteriorate as other
firms gradually develop goods and services that obsolete the product of
*
thisfirm). Let r be the largest value of r that has positive probabll
* *
whenx =x(recall that x=maxx (ii),andthat r is finite by virtue o
1.1±). Then firms with < 'have
—*
=, andfirms with
have So if￿, somust be This explainE
thesecond statement in2.iv; that is, if￿, then,with probability
one,so will be the entire sequence
S
+
Figure 2: Policies in the Active Exploration lodel
V (w)
&35
Sinceall values of wa induce permanent exit, there is no need to
distinguish among them. It is, therefore, convenient to transform the




Let K = —a,,so that if f(a,t) ￿ K, so is f(&t+l). We shall work only
with values of f(i) in what follows. At the risk of some notational
confusion, then, we also label its values by a'.
With this understanding, theorem 2.2, implies that the sequence {a't}
together with any a, <Kis a finite state Iarkov chain on ft ={0,1,...,K}.
Its 'zero' or 'death' state is absorbing, so the transition matrix for the
chain is given by ,where
P [p. •1 — 1,3
andfor0<i￿K (3)
for I￿ j > 0 p.r *
Ep(r=J_1Ix(i)),forj= 0.
TwOremarks are in order here. First, recall that realizations of a,






of is also determined by a, and {t} is a Iarkov process, S is a
s of two Mackay processes. But a process which is a sum ofMackay36
processes is not, in general, Iarkov. So the observable 51 process is
not Iarkov.
The second point to note concerns the mortality of firms. Assumption
*
(Liii)insuresthat there exists a finite n ,suchthat for n>n
sun {p?o: iefl} ￿ c >0,
where p'7 .=Pr{w+= ilu' = i}.Since p0 0 =1,this implies that all
i,] n
states but 0 are 'transient'. That is, no matter its initial ai,afirm
will, with probability one, reach zero in finite time and stay there.
Firms, like people, eventually die.
Since the passive learning model implies that fins can survive
forever there is a sense in which this latter result differentiates the
model with active exploration from the passive learning model. However, i
order to make empirical use of this distinction we would require a very
long time series of data. On the other hand, the passive learning model
did have the additional implication that the size distribution of survivir
firms ought to be stochastically increasing in any finite range of ages
(corollary 2.9). For comparison, we now consider the properties of the




be an L—1 dimensional simplex, so that any qfQK can be regarded as a37
density on fl. Note that a potential entrant with an w=O would not enter,
so that the initial distribution of the & in a cohort is a it can
be shown (see Ericson and Pakes, 1989) that no tatter the initial
the w and S distributions of the survivors in period t, say
P(.jt,p°) and Ps(.lt, p0)
each converge (point wise), as t grows large, to a unique invariant
distribution, say
and
(these distributions are invariant to both p0 and to the passage of time).
One can actually go one step further than this and show that, given some
additional regularity conditions on the location of p0 and on the
transition probabilities, there will be a finite t ,suchthat for any p
(4) P5(.t+1, 0) P5(•tt,p°)
I
providedt>t .Thatis, not only does the size—distribution of surviving
*
firmsconverge to an invariant distribution, but after some t the
convergence will be 'monotone' and the size distribution of surviving firms
will stochastically increase from period to period (just as in the passive
learning model).
Still, however, the empirical implications of the active learning
model on the evolution of the size—distributions of surviving firms are
weaker than those of the passive learning model. In particular the active38
learning model does not predict that the size distribution will be
stochastically increasing at each age. On the other hand, the active
learning model does not bar this event from occurring, anditcanpredict
that the size distribution will be stochastically increasing at later ages.
There is, however, at least one set of observable implications which
differentiate between the two models more sharply. tecall that in the
passive learning model the parameter that determines the distribution of
profits is tine invariant. This induces a dependence between the initial
size of a firm and the size at any future date. Indeed as equation (2.12)
shows, the passive learning model implies the stronger result that the
conditional distribution of size at t, conditional on the immediate past
sizes and the initial size, will always be strictly increasing in the
initial size. In the active learning model the parameter determining the
firm's profitability distribution, i.e. &,evolvesover time. Later year
size realizations are governed by a different value ofi than those from
earlier years and, as time passes, the dependence between the later and
earlier values of ,andtherefore of size, dies out. This is also true
for the conditional distribution of S; i.e. the distribution of St
conditional on immediate past values of S should gradually become
independent of initial year sizes. loreover, since the dependence of on
its history is only through the value of we might expect that if we
condition on immediate past sizes the dependence on initial size will die
out relatively quickly. Indeed, in the extreme case where S =(&),so
that sales is a deterministic function of ''theconditional distribution
of St depends only on Sf1. In this case a three year panel is enough to
differentiate the active from the passive learning model.
Vhen there is noise in the relationship between and size we must39
baseour distinction between the active and the passive learning model on
more detailed properties of the stochastic process generating size
conditional on survival. Let be that process (it is described
formally in Appendix 2). Then, the active learning model implies that as r
grows large the distribution of (S7, becomes, roughly
spe:ing, independent of realizations of (St,.. .,S). lore precisely, we
have lemma 6 and its implications (explained i.mediately after presentation
of the lemma).
5. Lemma (—inixing of the {S} process).
Let {S}1 be the stochastic process formed from the distribution of
sales conditional on survival and any initial Q0e(1,2,. ..,K),and l be the
u—algebra generated by possible realizations of S, S1,. ..,S. Then {S}
—nüxes at a geometric rate, i.e.
sup(P(E2IE1)-P(E2fl, E1 with P(E1) >0and E1fI,E2I7) AT
with< 1.
EiQ.i.See Appendix 2 [1
Lemma 5 states that any dependence between size realizations that
occur after xr, and size realizations that occur before x, goes down
geometrically in r. It implies that for k ￿ 040
(6)sup [E p5(zst_i,. ..,st_k,sl,xt=1) —Ps(zIst_i...stpxt=1)I]￿
Akc
1
for some 0<1, on a set of t—i''"t--k with probability one. That is b
choosing k sufficiently large we can make the conditional distribution of
conditional on '5t—k' and i' as close as we like to being
independent of the precise realization of s1. Note that equation (2.13)
insures that this is not the case in the passive learning model. The neil
corollary is an immediate implication of (5) and (6).
7.Corollary
For any k ￿ 0
—
E[St!stl,...,stk,xt=1]￿
on a set of with probability one. [1
Recall that corollary (2.14) insures that in the passive learning
model the conditional expectation of S,conditionalon any realization,
(_5t—2'5t—k'
s1) and survival until t, is strictly increasing in
lience corollary (1) differentiates the active from the passive
learning model. The distinction between the two models is particularly
striking in the special case where St =S(&t),
in which case 1k=0 for hi
Ve now consider the econometric techniques needed to bring this
distinction to data.41
Section 3: Estimation and Testing
There are two nonparametric implications of the models we are
considering that will be investigated empirically. The first is whether
the size distribution of surviving fins is stochastically increasing in
age; or whether, for all t
P(it) > P(.It—l). (1)
The passive learning model implies it must, while the active exploration
model implies it may, but need not —atleast in the early ages. The
second question posed of the data is whether, for different values of k,
E[StlS_i =s,...,St_k =5tk's1 =s,Xt =1] (2)
is strictly increasing in s1. Again the passive learning model says it
must be. But here there is a sharper contrast with the implications of the
active exploration model. The model with active exploration implies that,
for t large enough, the regression function in (2) cannot depend on s. To
check whether (1) seems consistent with the data, we will simply plot and
compare the size distribution at different ages. It is more difficult to
present a pictoral representation 0f the regression function in (2). Our
analysis of its properties must, therefore, be somewhat more formal.
This section develops an intuitive nonparaetnic estimator for (2),
and then considers tests of whether or not it is increasing in s. Indeed,
since both models imply that the regression junction is nondecreasing in
s1, we employ a two—part testing sequence. Vefirst test whether (2) is42
weakly increasing in s1. If this were not the case we would doubt whether
either of our models provided an adequate approximation to the process
generating the data being analyzed. If, on the other hand, the hypothesis
of weak monotonicity is acceptable, we love on to test the null of whether
the regression function does not depend on s against the alternative of it
being strictly increasing in that variable. Acceptance of both null
hypotheses is interpreted as support for the active exploration model,
while acceptance of only the first is interpreted as support for passive
learning.
To obtain our estimator of the regression function we define J
positive numbers, say {j}1' and use them to break into cells, as in
figure 3. e then define the function o(.): LR [i,...,J] which assigns
to each St the number of the cell it falls into, i.e. for j=1,. ..,J,
=(S)=iif and only if, < St ￿ (3a)





Figure 3: The Function. o(S)..43
Similarly for k <tdefine the junction ok(.): [1,... ,J]l, by
k(st_l) ={u(S_i),(St_2), ...,(S),(S1)}. (3b)
In the empirical analysis we treat all values of S that fall into the
same cell as equivalent (for the theoretical properties of the test
statistics we require that the cell or 'band' width go to zero at an
appropriate rate). For our purposes, then, a {S_i, S_2,...,St,Si}
history of a firm which survives until period t is one of the Jk possible
values of cl((St_1). Each of these values is a k+1 diiensional cell, and we
denote the set 0f such cells by {c;p=1,... ,J1}. Our testing procedure
is based on estimating the mean and the variance of the regression function
in (2) in the intervals defined by these cells.






Now consider a random sample of firms from the population of interest and
let and be the sample analogues of and k (that is the vector of
the sample's cell means and the sample's within cell variances). Finally
let be the vector containing the square root of the nuiber of firms
falling into each cell. Then the central licit theorem and the law of




where diag[x] denotes a diagonal Latrix with x on the principal diagonal,
>readsconverges in distribution, denotes convergence in
probability, and N(.,.) denotes the .ultivariate norial distribution.
Now consider possible values of =[c(St_l),...,c(St..¾)].
The tes
for weak monotonicity of the regression function in S1 is a test of





whenevera1u2. Similarly the testof whether the realization of S1 do





soreformally assume that, for eachc, the vector is ordered by
the associated values of u(S1). Then each of theweak Lonotoflicity
constraints can be represented as a linear inequality
constraint of the
form r' 2 0, when r' =[0,...O,—1,1,O,...O].
Gathering all such
constraints into the matrix R, the null hypothesis ofweak ionotoniCitY
written as45
r 0, (6).
!ote that k is of full row rank, say C. Ve want a test of (6) under the
maintained hypothesis that r IRc.
Using results dating back to Barlow, Bartholemew, Breaner and Brunk
(193), Appendix 3 shows that the difference between an unconstrained
estimate of r, and an estimate constrained to satisfy (6), cam be used to
build a test statistic for the hypothesis in (6), say which,
conditional on r=O, has a limiting distribution given by a weighted average
of chi—square deviates. That is, if we let {V(c)}0 be the required
sequence of weights, then the probability that is greater than any a>0,





Note that, if is the realized value ofT1[]provides the p_value
(or the probability of type I error) of a test that would reject the null
if when the true value of r was zero. The p—value when r is any
value greater than zero cannot be larger.
Unfortunately there is no simple way of calculating the values of the
weights, that is of the {V(c)}0, needed to obtain T1[X]. As a result
Appendix 3 develops a simulated estimate of the V(c), say V
[V(1),. ..,V(C)J, and a consistent (as the number of simulations draws grows
large) estimator for the variance—covariance matrix of ,sayV(V). This
allows usto base our empirical work onestimated p—values and their
variances. That is, each test result given in the next section will46
contain the two numbers,
(8a) T1[] =cO V(c)Pr{X >x}V'I (say),
and
(8b) =X'V(V)X
The test of the null hypothesis that the regression function in (2)
does not depend on s1 conditional on it being nondecreasing in that
variable is a test of the null hypothesis,
(9) ll: RkO
under the maintained hypothesis given by in (6). The test
statistic for this hypothesis, say is based upon the difference betwe
the estimate that satisfies the nonnegativity constraints in (6) and zero
and Appendix 3 shows it to have a limit distribution which, conditional 0'
thenull in (9), is also a weighted average of chi—square deviates. Agai
the weights are difficult to calculate but easy enough to sisiulate.
Letting the simulated values of these weights be V' =[V(i),...,V(C)],an
the observed value of the test statistic be the empirical results for
the test that the regression function does not depend on s1 conditional o
it being non—decreasing in that variable each contain the two nuiribers,47
C -
(lOa) Tz[xJ =cO V(c)Pr{ >x}V'X, (say),
and
(lob) v[Tz[x]] =I'v[v]x.
Ve also compare this sequence of tests, that is the test for weak
montonicity under an unconditional iaintained hypothesis coupled with the
test of the hypothesis that s has no effect on the regression function
conditional on the maintained that any effect is nondecreasing, to the uiore
familiar test of whether s has no effect on the regression function
conditional on an unconstrained maintained hypothesis. The latter test
statistic of the null hypothesis in (9), say has the familiar
chi—square limit distribution with C Degrees of freedom. It can be shown
that
= +
withprobability one. So the observed value for the test of no effect of
s1 conditional on an unconstrained maintained, say will be just the sua
of and y. For comparison, our tables will also provide the p—value of
x, T[x] (these can be found in standard tables).
Section 5. The Data and the Emoirical Results
The data used in this study were obtained from the Visconsin
Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations' (bURR's) records for
unemployment insurance (UI) coverage. The records for the years between
1978 and 1986 (inclusive) were linked together by UI account number by45
DavidNeuendorfand Ron Shaffer (see Neuendorf and Shaffer, 1987).7
Any private employer hiring at least one worker andpayingat least
$1,500 in a quarter is required to file information on the number of
workers, wages, and UI taxcontributions to DILIk. For the purposes of our
analysisthe first time it does so is treated as the 'birth' of the firm.
Size in that, and in subsequent, years is measured by the number of
employees.
The unit used to match observations over time was the UI account
number. Vhen a new business changes ownership or legal status, DILER
freezes its current account and either creates a new account, or, in the
case of an acquisition, merges the employment information into another
account.Vhen this occursthe old account has a successor code, and a new
account,ifcreated, will have a predecessor code. New accounts which were
a resultof achange in legal status (and therefore had a predecessor code)
wereseparated outand not treated as a part of a birth cohort in this
analysis.Analogouslywe use the successor code to distinguish between
attritiondue to liquidation,and attrition due to mergers (and other
changesin legalstatus). A major advantage of this type of data is that
it can distinguish between these two sources of 'exit'.
Tables 2 and 3 provide information on the evolution of the size
distribution of the surviving firms from the 1979 birth cohort in retail
and in manufacturing, respectively (recall, from Table 1, that these two
sectors account for 80 percent of the employment in our sample). The row
labelled 'count' gives the number of firms active in the column age. The
row labelled transferring out provides the number of firms which were
active in the column year but transferred out (due to a change in legal
status)before 1986. Thissource of attrition accounts for about 8Z of the49
1979cohort in retail trade, and about 4% in manufacturing. This should be
compared to the extent of liquidation (the figures given in the row
labelled mortality rates). Over 60% of the 1979 birth cohort in retail
liquidated before 1986, and the analogous figure in manufacturing was over
50%. Since liquidation was quantitatively so much sore important a source
of attrition in these data, we simply omitted those fins who subsequently
changed ownership from the analysis. (Kowever, almost identical empirical
results are obtained if we include the fins in the analysis until the year
before they transfer out.)
The passive learning model implies that the proportion of surviving
firms with size greater than any I, or the numbers in each row of the body
of the tables, should increase with age (i.e., as we move from left to
right on the table). Ye have 'squared off' the adjacent transitions which
do not satisfy this condition. On the whole, the consistency of the data
with the hypothesis is quite striking —particularlyin retail. Of the
seventy—seven possible adjacent transitions, only six are decreasing, and
none of them indicate a fall of more than 1.0%. In manufacturing there are
nine transitions which decrease; two fall by more than i.5%, and two more
by .6%. Given the possibilities for reporting and recording errors in this
type of data (see Neuendorf and Shaffer, 1987), if the null were true, we
would not find these results to be 'surprising'. That is, to us these
results are quite consistent with the implications of passive learning —
indeedamazingly so for retail trade. Note also that, in both sectors, the
means are strictly increasing in age.
A more detailed look at these two tables uncovers some revealing
contrasts between the evolution of the size distributiod in the two
sectors. The size distribution in the initial year is not much different50
between the two sectors; indeed if anything the initial size distribution
is slightly 'larger' in retail trade (retail has the larger initial year
mean, 5.4 vs. 4.9, and a higher percentage of the firms in the largest size
classes). However, by age eight this ordering has turned around. That is,
by age eight the size distribution for manufacturing is stochastically
larger (even in the strict sense) than that in retail (the means are 13.3
vs 8.8, and manufacturing has over twice the fraction of firms with 50 or
more employees). The size distribution is stochastically increasing in age
in both sectors, but it is increasing at a much more rapid rate in
manufacturing.
loreover, the age eight distribution in retail is quite close to the
cross—sectional distribution of all retail firms active in 1978 (or 1986,
see the last two columns of the table). Both have about 3 of their firms
with more than 50 employees (though the cross—sectional distribution still
has the larger mean, 14 vs. 9). In contrast, the age eight distribution in
manufacturing is much smaller than the 1978 cross—sectional distribution in
that sector. In manufacturing the cross—sectional distribution has more
than three times the fraction of firms with more than 50 employees (19.6
vs.6.5), and a mean which isalmost six times that from the age eight
distribution (73.8 vs. 13.3). Thus, if we were to think of the
cross—sectional distribution as an approximation to the limit distribution
(even though formally it is not), then we might conclude that by age eight
the retail cohort had almost reached it, but the manufacturing cohort was
still nowhere near its limit distribution. Indeed, if we also assumed that
eight years was enough time to form a fairly precise posterior about a tine
invariant profitability paramenter, then we would conclude that the data
from retail was supportive of the passive learning model, but the data from51
manufacturingwas not.
A more formal check of the consistency of the data with the two models
can be derived from an analysis of the regression for size at age eight on
size in the immediate preceding periods, and size at age one. Both .odels
imply that this function will be weakly increasing in initial size, but the
passe learning model implies that it be strictly increasing in that
variable, and the active learning .odel isplies that it will not.
Tables 4 and 5 provide some evidence on the relevant hypothesis.
Because there were less than half the number of entering firms annually in
manufacturing, we aggregated the 1979 and 1980 Lanufacturing cohorts and
examined the regression for expected sales at age seven of the aggregated
cohort. The cell size cutoffs were set at the beginning of the analysis
and not changed thereafter. For the weak sionotonicity, and the zero
conditional on monotonicity, restrictions, we have presented two sets of
'p—values' for each observed value of the test statistic. The first column
provides the simulated estimates of the true p—values as explained in
Section 4 (the estimated standard errors of these estimates appear in
parentheses below their values). The second column provides the p—values
that would be obtained if the components of the estimator of the vector of
constraints being tested had mutually independent distributions under the
null. In this case the weights required for the calculation of the limit
distribution (see equation 4.7) have an analytic form (see appendix 3), so
there is no need for simulation. Though the independence assumption is
wrong in our (and probably in most) cases, it does provide an easily
calculable approximation to the non—analytic true p-value which might be of
use in (at least) the preliminary stages of analysis if the approximation
produced numbers that were sufficiently close to those we are after.52
Comparing columns (1) and (2) in the next four tables it is clear that in
the cases where the true p—values were low (say less than .10), so that
there was some chance of rejecting the null, the approxilation did produce
a value within .05 of the value we were after.
iote first that none of the tests reject weak ionotonicity at
traditional levels of significance. So both the retail and the
manufacturing data are consistent with the hypothesis that the regression
function is nondecreasing in i' just as both our aodels predict. There
the similarity in the test results on the two data sets ends. In retail it
is clear that if we condition on one lagged value of S, that is on
realizations of S7, and then vary s1, firms with larger s have larger
average sales at age 8. There is really no doubt about this point as the
p—value of the test statistic is essentially zero, so we would reiect the
null at any traditional significance level. The same is true if we
condition on s7 and or on s7, s6 and s5; or even on s7, S6, 65 and s4;
and then vary s. In all these cases realizations of S1 have an
independent effect on the expectation of sales at age eight. This
dependence only starts to become insignificant at five percent significance
levels when we condition on five past sales realizations. Rowever, this
might well be a result of the possibility that, with our limited amount of
data, a fifth order nonparanietric autoregression would provide an adequate
approximation to the expectation for size generated from any stochastic
process —(—niixingor not; we come back to this point below).8
The results for the test of zero conditional on weak sonotonicity are
strikingly different in manufacturing. Table 5 indicates that, in
manufacturing, once we condition on a single lagged value of S, i.e. a
realization of S6, an' differences in s do not effect the expected size at53
ageseven. This time there is little doubt about accenting the null as the
p—value is well above .5. loreover, the same results obtain if we
condition instead on and s; or on 6' and 54; or 6' 84 and 83.
Tables6 and 7 push the nonparametric analysis one step further and
ask what order of Iarkov process provides an adequate nonparametric fit to
the (npectation from the) stochastic process generating size conditional
on survival in retail and in manufacturing. The tests in these tables
follow a pattern analogous to that in Tables 4 and 5. That is, we first
test whether first year size, size in the first two years, ... , havea
nondecreasing effect conditional on the variables left in the regression
function; and then test whether we can accept a zero effect conditional on
any of the existing effects being nondecreasing. Again theresults are
quite clear. Ye never reject weak monotonicity. In retail we need a fifth
order nonpararnetric Iarkov process to adequately approximate the data.
Recall that this is precisely the same 'k' we needed before we could accept
the null that the conditional regression function for size, conditional on
'5t—k' did not depend on In contrast, in manufacturing a third
order nonparametric Iarkov process seems to provide an adequate fit to the
data. That is, in manufacturing there is a distinction between the orders
needed for the —inixing and the Iarkov tests (compare tables 7 and 5).
Table 5 says that conditional on realizations of S6 realizations of S1 do
not affect the regression function. Table 7 says that realizations ofS5,
and of S4, do. The active exploration model explains this difference by
allowing the parameter that determines the size distribution to evolve over
tine in a 'smooth' fashion, so that its value in year 5 will tend to be
closer to its value in year 7, and therefore have a more distinct effect on54
the regression function for 57, than its value in year 1 wjll.
Section 6. Further Imolications of the Emuirical Lesults.
Our empirical results can be suamarized quite succinctly. The
nonparametric implications of the active exploration model are consistent
with the data in manufacturing, while the monparaaetric iaplications of the
passive learning model definitely are not. On the other hand, the
nonparametric implications of the passive learning model seem consistent
with the data in retail trade, while those from the active learning model
do not. These distinctions ought to effect the typeof models we use to
analyze phenomena that depend upon firm—specific uncertainties and
differences in output paths among firms within an industry; phenomena such
as the behavoir of capital markets when there are significant failure
probabilities, or supply responses to environmental and policy changes that
can induce exit.
The nonparametric results ought also to effect how we account for
liquidation induced attrition in the analysis of longitudinal firm—level
data. As an example of the importance of such corrections, consider the
following excerpt from Davis, Galiman, and Rutchins, "Productivity in
American Vhaling: The New Bedford Fleet in the Nineteenth Century."
"The age of the vessel (entered as age and age squared) also
captures the effects of more than a single set of factors.
Elements of wear and tear that influenced productivity, a
technical characteristic that one might hope to capture in the
age variable, are confounded with the consequence of qualitative
differences among survivors; ineffective vessels were transferred55
bytheir owners to other activities, were condemned at an early
age, or were destroyed in service."
Davis, Gallian and lutchins (1987) p.26.
The quotation illustrates how even one of the most traditional of
varibles (age), in one of the most traditional of settings (productivity
analysis), can have its "structural" effects (as a measure of the likely
extent of physical deterioration) confounded by the self—selection process
induced by the endogeneity of the liquidation decision (it also
demonstrates a remarkable understanding of the environment generating the
data). Davis, Galiman and Rutchins (1987) do indeed find a significant
Dositive first order effect of age on vessel productivity.
To see how the nonparametric implications used to test for the
relevance of alternative models can also be used to separate out the
structural production function coefficients in examples such as this one,
assume that output is a parametric function of inputs, say f(xt, fi),andan
additive disturbance,-say ,whosevalue is not known when input decisions
are made. Then the expectation of output conditionalon the current
value of inputs (xt), survival until period t (x. =1),and the information
set available in t—l is a sum of two functions; the structural
production function, and the expectation of the disturbance conditional on
and it—i' i.e.
E[yIx, =l, J] =f(xt,fi)
+E[EtIxt=l,
Nownote that both models imply that the decision as to whether to operate
the firm in year t is determined by information available in t—l (i.e. x56
ismeasurable with respect to so the last term depends only on
variables in This implies that none of the determinants of E[ytIx,
h—i] are determinants of both, f(.;fi) and E[EtIxt=l, J1]. As a
result, once we determine which of the dynamic models are relevant for the
data at hand, and therefore what variables determine E[tIxt=1, we
can, under mild regularity conditions, obtain a (root n) consistent
asymptotically normal estimator for fi0 (the true value of fi) by minimizing
a distance between t and the sum of f(xt,fi) andanonparametric estimator
forthe'nuisance' function E[cIx_i=l, J1] (for details see Lobinson,
1988).Notethat this method of correcting for the selection process
inducedbyliquidation behavior is fully consistent with the economic
modelsgeneratingliquidation behavior anddoesnot either; 1) depend on
theprecisefunctional form of the relevant dynamic stochastic processes;
or2)requirea solution to the computationally difficult problem of finding
theoptimalstopping states as a function of the parameters of the model.
If the modelwithactive exploration were relevant then the
distributionofconditionalon would be determined by productivity
realizations in the immediately proceeding periods and the amount of
exploratory investment; while, in the passive learning •odel, this
expectation would depend on age and earlier, as well as the immediately
preceeding, productivity realizations. So the selection correction
procedure would differ with the nonparametric implications of the
behavioral model assumed to generate liquidation decisions: implications
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 Table 4.Testsfor MeanIndependenceof theDistributionof St
Conditional on S1,..., Sk, from S1
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acohort dimensions: number in cohort —1,275;number of firma reaching
age eight 464.
bThvalue in column (1) is a simulated estiaate of the true p—value and
thevalue just below it is the standard error of this estimate. Ten
simulation draws were used to calculate the estimates of the orthant
probabilities. The value in column(2)is obtained by assuming each
orthant has equal probability (see the explanation in the text).Table 5. Tests for Mean Independence of the Distribution of St
Conditional on S1,..., Sk, from S1
Data: Manufacturing, Combined 1979 and 1980 Cohorts
for t
Size Cutoffs: 2,5,10,25,50, +—
Weak Zero Conditional Unconditional
k Monotoicity b on Mont8nicity b Zero b
C XMp—values C xp-values Df XT p—value
(1) (2) (1) (2)
1 16 8.0 .54 .44 16 3.5 .57 .86 16 11.5 .78
(.06) (.07)
2 2517.6 .19 .17 25 5.8 .79 .91 25 23.6 .55
(.03) (.03)
3 2314.3 .28 .27 23 4.9 .81 .92 2319.3 .67
(.05) (.06)
4 1510.1 .13 .24 15 5.9 .54 .59 1516.0 .39
(.02) (.03)
aFi dimensions: number born in cohorts —737,number of firms
reaching age seven —353.
b5note b to Table 4.Table 6. Markov Tests for Propertiea of Retail Regression Punction
for Size at Age tight
Data: Retail, 1979 Cohorta
Size Cutoffs: 2,5,10,25,50, +
Markov Weak Markov Conditional Unconditional
Order Monotoeicity on Hont5nicity Makov for C y p—value Cxp-value Df
XT p—value
Tests (1) (2) (1) (2)
76 139.5 .13 .20 135.0 .48 .58 1314.5.34
(.03) (.05)
7 •5 2318.3 .16 .11 235.9 .64 .87 2324.2.40
(.02) (.05)
74 3218.3 .47 .32 3296.00 .00 32114 .00
(.05) (.00)
7 •3 3818.7 .56 .48 38100 .00 .00 32118 .00
(.05) (.00)
7 •2 4319.7 .76 .56 43107 .00 .00 43121 .00
(.03) (.00)
7 •1 4820.1 .92 .67 48149 .00 .00 48169 .00
(.01) (.00)
8CohortDimensions: number in cohort —1275;number of firns reaching
age eight —465;number in cells with )2—291.
bceii Dimensions: possible number —279,936;number populated 228;
number with >2observations —54.
cSee note b, Table 4.Table 7. Test! for Properties of Manufacturing aegression Function
for Size at Age Seven
DntrMnniifncttiring, Combined 1979 snd 1980 Cohortee
SizeCutoffs: 2,5,10,25,50, +_b
Markov Weak Markov Conditional Unconditional
Order Monotoicity on Hont8iticity Ma5kov
for C
y,p—value C;p—value Of x p—value
Teats (1) (2) (1) (2)
6 +5 911.9 .02 .04 9 2.0 .65 .75 914.0 .12
(.01) (.10)
6 +4 1513.3 .09 .10 1511.7 .07 .16 1525.1 .05
(.02) (.02)
6 •3 2515.5 .24 .27 2517.6 .11 .17 25 33.1 .13
(.05) (.03)
6 •2 3116.1 .42 .42 3161.3 .00 .00 31 77.4 .00
(.04) (.00)
6 •1 3716.3 .66 .59 3776.0 .00 .00 3792.3 .00
(.04) (.00)
acohort Dimensions: number of firms —737;number of firms reaching
age seven —353;number in cells with )2—179.
bceii Dimensions: possible number —46,656;number populated 217;
number with2 observations 43.
CSeenote b, Table 4.Footnotes
1SeeBeckman and Robb, 1985, and the literature cited there, for a
discussion of related issues in static frameworks.
2loredetailed discussions of tr orderings can be found in lilgrom
(1981), Ross (1983), and larshall and 01km (1979, chapter 18).
3Twapoints should be noted here. First we are ignoring the effect (on
both r(.) and S(.)) of random variables which have the same value for
different individuals at the same point in time, but differ in value over
time (this would have occurred in our example ii prices had varied over
tine). At the cost of complicating the notation we could add a price
process to our problem without changing any of our major results (though
some modifications would have to be made to the procedure that matches the
model to data; see below). Second, it should be noted that the
interpretation of r(.) and S(.) as mappings fro. realizations of ,would
only be appropriate for our example if were realized before input
decisions were made (larschak and Andrews, 1944). In this case both output
and inputs can be determined from and the size measure can be either
output produced or inputs purchased. The extreme alternative is to assume
there is no within—period adjustment to 17 (Zeliner, Imenta, and Dreze,
1966), in which case inputs are chosen to maximize 04
E(t)t+i F(Lt+1) —
where Et provides expectations conditional on current information
(and will be defined more precisely below). In this case r(.) and S(.)
would be interpreted as mappings from Et toEtrt+i, and input demand
in period t1 respectively. There are, of course, ineriiediate cases where
within period adjustment is either partial, or more costly (the appropriate
characterization is likely to depend upon the characteristics of the
industry being studied). Ye shall come back to some of the alternatives
below, but for now suffice it to note that the results we focus attention
on do not depend on the timing of the input decision.
4Thefollowing counterexample shows that this would not be the case if we
were to assume only a weaker first order stochastic dominance ordering.
Let 0 =(01,82)with 02 > 01, and consider the following family of
densities (with respect to the counting measure): p(17 =2102)
=
= 4182)=1/2,and p(17 lIOi) =('3t0)= 1/2.Clearly, P17(. 02)
> P,7(. Oi). However, if
=2,the posterior is 002 with probability
one, whereas if =3,the posterior is 0 =withprobability one; i.e.,
the posterior for 2 dominates the posterior for i =
5 Theassumptions that + is the same known value for all agents, and is
constant over time, are made for expositional convenience. Vhat is
requiredis that I not increasetoo rapidly with lore precisely, ifVt(nt) is the value of continuing in operation at t given that nt=nt (a
more precise definition of this function is given below), then what we need
is that Vt(nt) —tt(nt)
be nondecreasing in nt. Of course, the actual
behavior of "exit values" is an empirical question. If the process
generating the exit we are modelling is indeed a liquidation process, and
not a process generated by changes of ownership and continued operation of
the firm in a different guise, the assumptions we require ought not to be
problematic.
6Justas in our description of the passive leaning model we will assume
here, for expositional simplicity, that input choices are madeafterthe
realization of r, that liquidation values are a constant I, andthatthere
is no time—specific, firm—invariant process. Further, the formulation
presented here assumes that the conditional distribution of r does not
depend on w, an assunption not required for our results.
7Yeare grateful to them for granting us access to their data, and for
graciously answering our subsequent queries, lore detail on the data can
be found in the appendix of Neuendorf and Shaffer (1987). Though
multiestablishment firms have a choice as to whether to report as a single,
or as multiple units, the establishments of multiestablishment firms that
reported separately have been merged into single observations. This should
therefore be thought of as firm—level data.
6Yehave been motivating our two—part testing sequence as a way of
providing additional information on the relevance of alternative models.
Inequality tests were originally motivated as providing more powerful ways
of testing a given null. Table 4 also illustrates this point. Take, for
example, the case where k=2. The p—value in column 2 for acceptance of the
null that realizations of S do not matter under the maintained hypothesis
that any effect of S is non—decreasing, is zero; but the p—value for the
test that S does not matter under the unconstrained maintained hypothesis
(the unconditional zero columns) is a traditionally acceptable .11.
Footnote 2 discussed the possibility that input decisions are either
wholly, or partially, made before the realization of ,,andconcluded by
asserting that the various alternatives would not affect the results we
focus on. Table 7 insures this is so for the very special, but important,
case which Jovanovic's (1982) original article was based on. His
assumptions were a special case of the following ones; the process
generating {n} conditional on 0 was i.i.d., the posterior for U had
sufficient statistics (xt, t) with x =ft(xt_i,i)forsome and
that no input could be adjusted after any information about was
available. In this case, if input quantities were our size measure, size
in period t is determined by (xti,t) and for a given t, there is a 1:1
correspondence between and x_2. So size is a first order Iarkovprocess. This conclusion would be destroyed if so'e, say costly,
adjustments could be made after i were realized, or if there were any
dependence in the process generating {'}conditionalon 0. However, if
Jovanovic's restrictions were true, the passive learning model would
satisfy the constraint that the regression for St conditional on S_1,
St_k does not depend on S1 provided k ￿ 1; i.e., it would satisfy the
constraint used to test for the active learning model. On the other hand
Table 7 makes it clear that the stochastic process generatin; size is not
first order Iarkov, so the special case discussed by Jovanovic (1982) is
not relevant.keferences
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The three appendices provide results used in Sections 2, 3, and 4
respectively. Lemmas, equations, etc. are numbered in a separate
consecutive orderring within each appendix.
ApDendix I. Proofs of Results Vsed in Section 2.
Part 1. Theorem 2.7 (existence and lontonicity of the value function)
At each t there exists a unique Vt(.):Nt which provides the value
of continuing in operation assuming optimal behavior in each future period.
is bounded, satisfies (6), and is nondecreasing flflt; i.e.,if 4
4, thenV(4) > V(4) [for ntNt, and all t].
Theproof proceeds as follows. First it considers the finite horizon
problem in which a firm which remains active until_period T must liquidate
for 4 dollars at T+l. For this problem the value of continuing in
operation from period t (as a function of past ,7—realizations) will be
denoted by V(.): Nt -.R,,and the resulting stopping function by XT(.): Nt
-{o,i).V(.) can be determined by backward recursion from the terminal
year and a stopping policy which dictates liquidation if andonlyif the
value of continuing in operation is less than I. The implied stopping
function, x(nt), is one if and only if fltfjT{t: 4(4)
>i,
> 4,... ,V(n) > I). As T increases V(.) converges (pointwise)
to a limit function, V(.). This limit function is bounded, monotonic in
and satisfies the Bellman condition, i.e. equation 2.6, in the text.
The proof concludes by showing that V(.), and the associated limitstopping policy, are indeed the solution to the infinite horizon
problem.
Al Lemma P(I4)>P (.14) whenever 4 ￿ 4 (4,4N, and all t)
t+l
Proof Take any zeN. Then P (zlnt) =Jp
(zlnt,o)pe(delnt).
'7t+1 17t+1
P (zlnt,O) is nonincreasing in nt by (3.i) andstrictlydecreasing in 0
by (3.ii), while p0(.1t) is stochastically increasing in yt by (4)
A2 Lemma Fix any T then, V(4) ￿ V(4) whenever 4 >4(flt,4,t, and
t￿T).
ELQ.c!I Theproof is by backward induction on t. Note that
yT(flT) =f(C)P (d(InT)+fiI
1
which is nondecreasing in nT by






virtue of the monotonicity of r(.), and Al.






2where the inequalities are due to Al, the •onotonicity of r(.), and the
hypothesis of the inductive argunent. [ I
A3 Leiiuna Fix T. Then, V(nt) >V(n)(t Nt, and t￿T)
Proof. The proof is again by backward induction on t. For the initial
condition of the inductive argument, note that




Assuming the condition is true for a =t+1we have
VT1(nt)=f(C)p (dCInt)8Jwax[+,VT(,nt)]P (d(jnt)
l7t+1 '7t+l
>Ji(P (d(Int)+flJinax[f,V+i(C,nt)]P (dCInt)V(nt). [
Proof of Theorem 2.7
Lemma A3 insures that for each (t,nt) the 1iit,
Vt(nt) =lim..V(nt),
exists. Let sup,NT(17) [ exists and is finite by virtue of the
compactnessof Nand the continuity of i(.)].Itis straightforward to
shothat isbounded,uniformly over t,bythe constant function






f ii max [I ,Vl(,nt)] (dIn)
by the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem, since {max[,VT+l(C,nt)} is
dominated by max(,(1—fi)1i) which is integrable with respect to
P (.Int).
-1
Ve have shown that if and the associated stopping policy, were
optimal, then they would satisfy the conditions of the theorem. Yhat
remains is to show that they are indeed optional. To see this assume, to
the contrary, that there exists an alternative stopping policy, say
where Xr(nT) is one if a firm with ,realizationsof n' is in
operation in period r and zero otherwise, which generates a value function,
say V(nt), which satisfies, for at least one (t,nt),
(A4) V(nt) -Vt(nt)
> > 0.
Note that for any arbitary T< Et{EfiT[Xt+r(t4T)f(flt+T)+{Xt+r(t4T)_Xt+r_l(tnl)}I+$ i/(1_fi)
(A5)
vT(nt)flT/(1fl) ￿ V(n) +pT(1_p)_1￿ +
wherevT(.) is the value function that arises when the policy {x,.(•)} is
followed for a T—horizon problem. The first inequality follows from the
fact that current returns are bounded by I, the second from the fact that
V(nt) is the optimum for the T horizon problem, and the third is from A3.
Provided T is chosen to be greater than —tn[f(1—fi)/] /—tnfl,equations A4
and A5 contradict one another.
Part 2. Theorem 2.11 (conditional distributions for
Let t and k be positive intergers with t >k,and (i1,. i) be any
selection of k distinct elements from {1,. .. ,t—1}.Then if
(n ,... ,n)andn =(n,...,n2)arearbitrary (il,...ik) histories of
'1 2 '1
rjsatisfyingn1 >2'
and is defined as in (2.8),
P(.ln1,x=l) >s x=i).




It '7tNow use Bayes law to show that for > 4-4,
p(t_1fl1,9)p(4_lfl2, 0) -p(t_1j2,e)p(4lIfl1,o)
=k[p(iI,7t_l,0)p(24,0) —p(n114,°)p(21,t_l,g)] ,o,
where the inequality is a trivial consequence ofbeing deteruined by
Since conditioning on ,7tEA ={t:xt(t) =1}does not affect the
£r—ordering, we have
(A7) P(.Ini,xt1,0) trw P,7 (.1n2,Xt =1,0).
Given (A6), (A7) and lemma 2, the theorem requires only that
P0(. I) >P9(.
2) But by lemma 4, this condition is satisfied
provided -
P(I01).er Pfl(.102).
whenever 01 >02Take any Ri >R2'then
P(Ril0i) p(IO2) —p(I02)p(2I01)
1[,7t(' R1I01)
112102) — R2I01) P,7t(d R1102)] >
wherethe integral runs over those whose indices are in {l,. .. ,t—i},but
are not in 11'••''k}' and the inequality results from (3.11). [1Appendix 2. Proofs of kesults Used In Section 3
Part 1. Theorem 3.2 (properties of the active exploration model)
A unique optimal policy and associated value function exist and they
have the following characteristics:
i) V() is bounded and nondecreasing in e'.
ii) The optimal policy, x(J) is bounded, depends only on current ,and
is stationary, i.e. for all r
x(J7) =x(&7)
=x*(r)￿i
iii)Thereexists a couple, (,) with,—a & < , suchthat
=0if i{':w"<






tEr.I: By Assumption 3.1, the model has a stationary larkovian structure.
Hence an optimal policy, if one exists, can be chosen from the class of
Iarkov policies [Dynkin and Yushkevich (1975), p. 148]. Existence and
properties (i) and (ii) are an immediate consequence of Theorem 5 of
Blackwell (1965). That is, let UEt()anddefine an operator T: t-1
pointwiseas follows:
(Al) TU(u)max{sup(J R(i,,x)P (di&) +$(&+r)p(rx)),I},
x>O
'7 '7
where p. is the density of It is straightforward to show that I is a
monotone contraction operator, so that the banach Fixed Point Theorem [D.R.
Smart (1974), p. 2—3] gives existence of a unique monotone function V:
uniformlybounded, and satisfying V =TV.That V is nondecreasing in
follows from the monotonicity of I-(17)andc(.i) and the dominance properties
of the families IP and Pr (3.l.i, 3.1.ii). As V() is uniformly bounded
both above and below, investment x (s') must also be bounded:
* *
x(s') [O,1. That x ()isunique follows from the strict concavity
of the optimand in (Al) in x [Assumption 3.1.iii].
Since the optimal policy solves the pointwise optimization (Al) we
have the first order conditions
(A2) {c() -fiE [V(r)- V(&)]pr(rjx)}.x
=0
{V() .-I}.I1-()] = 0.
Toshow propertY (iii) we note that x(&) >0iff
! \()- V(wYp(rIx)} >c(&)r',and that c() is bounded away frorzero (3.l.iii). Let ={V—V(i)< }andfl ={JIV(J)-4<e},where V =
supV().These are clearly nonempty since V(i) is monotonic, I =
irifV()=liniV() and V =liii'V(&). If w then all j'< are also
contained in fl, and similarly &fl
implies that all " ￿ w are contained
in fl; hence each of these sets contains infinitely manystates.Ve will
show that E[V(*r) —V(i)JP(rIx) can be madearbitrarilysmall in both
sets, implying that investment must optimally cease.
The boundaries,—1e and i +1fl, for some generally




Tocomplete this argument we
show that the l.h.s. of this expression can be made arbitrarily small on
An identical argument, mutatis mutandus, can be used to show the same
for fl. Note that compact support for IPX,T,[Assumption 3.1.ii] implies
that there exists an such that V& ,P{7l\flIx}
=0Yx ￿ 0, i.e.
the transition probability puts zero weight on states not in fl1. Then
E [V(r)-V( p(rx)} < .
Hencethe impact of investment on future expected returns becomes
arbitrarily small as iincreasesin O, so we can find a boundary above
which no investment will optimally take place. Letthe lowest of such
boundaries. Similarly we can find a greatest ai such that x(i) =0,
which we label .
Toshow property (iv)we need only note that x(') =0implies
P{OO) 1sothat once￿ .forany t, Vs ￿ t& ￿ i.Since3.1.i
insures there exists an such that for all ,Jr()P,7(dI&)
(1—L)I.for< mm (, w)(A3) V(&) =max{Jr()P (d 4')fi EV(&+i-)p(rJO), I) =I.
'7 '7 '7 r(O
Let w be the greatest such w at which A3 holds. To show existence of
,letk ={suppT). As P{OIO} =1,￿ +kmust surely hold since the
probability of transfering to a higher atfromany at'>iszero, and the
highest aipotentiallyachievable from at'￿ 1 is at'+ k.Hence, Vat0
Pr{w1
=1,and by induction Pr{at ￿ Iat} =1,whereisthe




Part 2. Lemma 3.6 (—mixing of the {S} process).
Let be the stochastic process formed from the distribution of
sales conditional on survival and any initial atoc{1,2,. .. ,E},and be the
c—algebragenerated by possible realizations of S, S1,. .. ,S.Then {S}
—mixes at a geometric rate, i.e.
sup{P(E2E1)—P(E2)j, E1 with P(E1) >
0and E1cI,E2eJ+} ￿ AØ
with <1.
E.mQIBriefly,the probability space for this process is constructed from
the finite set S ={S:S=S('7),7cN}, the family of probability measures for
,7, I?, and the Iarkov transition matrix for at,Pas follows. The sample
space consists of the set of all possible infinite sequences of elements
from ,saycYandthe required u—algebra is the smallest c—algebra
containingo5 LetQbeformed from Ebydividing its 1th row by 1p1,(for i =1,...,k) and then deleting its first row and column. Q is the
Iarkov transition matrix for conditional on andsurvivaluntil
t1. !ote that 3.1.ii together with 3.2 insure that this transition matrix
is irreducible aperiodic (see Billingsley, 1979, chapter 1). The measures
for the alternative sample paths can be computed directly from Q, and
To prove the lemma let S ={S,...,S}.
Then it suffices to show
that for any E1J such that P(E1) >0,andany E2EI
P{(S'cE2)fl(SeE1)}
—p{S;+rE} P{SE1}I ￿ AT
(Billingsley 1968, section 20). Since both E2 and are finite sets we
can, without loss of generality, assume that both are singletons. Taking
r=x=l for siniplicity, and recalling that S = + kwhere the
distribution of conditional on depends only on ,thefirst
probability within the absolute value sign can be wriften as
pf(ca — — - S -
S1
= P{u+is+i_i(w+ij)Iui5i_i(wi )''r+1 'w1=i}
'i"r+l
P{w+1j Iu1=s1i(1=i) ,1=i} P{u1=s1—I(w1=i) Iw1=i}P{uii}
i1 E1 P(s+1-i(i)Ii)q(T)p(S1_j(W1=i)i)p
where provides the 7-—period transition probabilities from the Q






(see Billingsley, 1979, sec. 1.8). Using this invariant distribution to
evaluate the unconditional probability that =

















k k * kk *
•ql ￿ A0 E E q.
i=1 j=1' i=1j=1
where the last inequality follows from (A6). [1
Appendix 3. The Test Statistics1
Ve begin by developing a test for the null hypothesis that
The reader interested in more detail on the testing procedures used in
this section should consult Barlow et. al. (1972), or the more recent
econometric literature on testing subject to inequality constraints
which begins with the work of Gourieroux, Folly, and lonfort (1982).
Golberger's (1987) exposition is particularly clear.ll: RpK= r
where B. has full row rank, say C, under the maintained hypothesis that
rCRC. To this end we consider the following two estimators for r
(A2a) r
(A2b) r1 =argmm [(r-r)' R{Vk]_1U(r_r)]
r>O
r is an 'unconstrained' estimator of r obtained from substituting sample
for population means. rk is a 'constrained' estimator, an estimator forced
to satisfy the inequality constraint of the null. Subject to that
constraint, it is obtained by minimizing a quadratic form in (r—r), where
the weighting matrix, R[Vk]_lR, is chosen to be the estimated
variance—covariance of r under the hypothesis that =o.
Sincethe quadratic form in (A2b) is nonnegative and equal to zero if
r =r,if r >0, r=r.Figure (4) illustrates possible solutions for r
in the case where C= 2.The ellipsoids represent sets of r which produce





then large realized values of this statistic are evidence against E.






as sample size grows large, where
(A4b) (c) Pr{r has exactly c zero components r=O},
and denotes a chi—square deviate with precisely c degrees of freedom
(c=O,.. .,C).Thus, if is the realized value of T1[] provides the
'p—value" (or the probability of type I error) of a test that would reject
the null if when the true value of r was zero. The p—value when r
isanyvalue greater than zero cannot be larger.
Unfortunately, the orthant probabilities, that is the values of
needed to obtain (A4a), are difficult to calculate. As a result
weobtain simulated estimates of their values, say 'andprovide a
simulated estimate of T1(.) say T1, where





>a}1.Since the can be regarded as cell means from repeated draws from a
multinomial distribution (where NSII, the nuiber of simulations, is the
number of draws), the variance of F1[a] about its expected value of T1[a]
can be obtained from the formula for the variance of a u1tinoiial as;
(A6) Var[T1(a)J =X'[diagV—VV']I(NSII1
So, along with T1(a), we provide an estimate of its variance obtained from
substituting the simulated for the actual values of V in this variance
formula.
Next we need a test of
(A7)R: kkO
under the maintained hypothesis given by in (Al). Once again in
(A2b) will serve as our estimate of r given R, while under the estimate
of r is zero (thus, in Figure 4, the ellipsoids bring us from r to the
estimator which abides by li, while the dashed lines bring us from the
latter to the estimator which abides by B). A .easure of the distance
between the estimator obtained conditional on the null and the estimator
which is only constrained to satisfy the iaintained hypothesis is given by
(A8) =rIE[Vk]_lRrI,
Once again, for all a >0C-
(A9a) T(a) =Pr{
>air=0) E V(c)Pr{X >a}
Cr0
as sample size grows large, where, in this case
(A9b) V(c) =Pr{r1has exactly c positive coaponentsr=0}
and 4isdefined as above (c =0,1,...,C). Letting X°Z be the observed
value of we will provide estimates of Tz[x], say Tz{x] (obtained from
simulating the V(c)), together with an estimate of the variance of Tz[X1
To compare this sequence of tests, that is the test for weak
monotonicity under an unconditional maintained hypothesis coupled with the
test of the hypothesis that s1 has no effect on the regression function
conditional on the maintained that any effect is nondecreasing, to the more
familiar direct test of whether has no effect on the regression function
conditional on an unconstrained maintained hypothesis, note that one test
of the latter would check whether
=rR[VkilRr
were close to zero. Under the unconstrained maintained hypothesis x has
the familiar chi—square distribution with C degrees of freedom. Since the
properties of Lagrange multipliers insure that
[r_r]R[Vk]—lRrI 0
we have from (A2b) arid (A8), that= x2 +
withprobability one.